LABOR RELATIONS LAW > COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT
When the parties, however, agree to deviate there from, and unqualifiedly covenant the payment of separation benefits irrespective of the employer's financial position, then the obligatory force of that contract prevails and its terms should be carried out to its full effect. If the terms of a CBA are clear and there is no doubt as to the intention of the contracting parties, the literal meaning of its stipulations shall prevail.
Clearly, the fact that the employer, with full knowledge of its financial situation, freely and voluntarily entered into such collective bargaining agreement with its employees, cannot be accepted as an excuse to clear itself of its liability to pay its employees of separation benefits under such agreement.
[2014V693] BENSON INDUSTRIES EMPLOYEES UNION-ALU-TUCP AND/OR VILMA GENON, et al. vs. BENSON INDUSTRIES, INC., G.R. No. 200746, August 06, 2014, J. Perlas-Bernabe
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Thursday, February 23, 2017
Money-Claim Underpayment Of Retirement Benefits
LABOR RELATIONS LAW > COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT
Money-claim underpayment of retirement benefits involves an issue arising from the interpretation or implementation of a provision of the collective bargaining agreement which according to Article 261 of the Labor Code falls within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Voluntary Arbitrator or Panel of Voluntary Arbitrators, and not the Labor Arbiter. Said provision, however, excluded from this original and exclusive jurisdiction, gross violation of the CBA, which is defined as "flagrant and/or malicious refusal to comply with the economic provisions" of the CBA.
[2014V656] UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS FACULTY UNION vs. UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS, G.R. No. 203957, July 30, 2014, J. Carpio
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Money-claim underpayment of retirement benefits involves an issue arising from the interpretation or implementation of a provision of the collective bargaining agreement which according to Article 261 of the Labor Code falls within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Voluntary Arbitrator or Panel of Voluntary Arbitrators, and not the Labor Arbiter. Said provision, however, excluded from this original and exclusive jurisdiction, gross violation of the CBA, which is defined as "flagrant and/or malicious refusal to comply with the economic provisions" of the CBA.
[2014V656] UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS FACULTY UNION vs. UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS, G.R. No. 203957, July 30, 2014, J. Carpio
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Hypertension And Glaucoma, Not Being Work-Connecte...
2014V1032
GSIS LAW (RA. 8291)
Petitioner filed the instant petition contending that respondent's illnesses, hypertension and Glaucoma, not being work-connected, cannot entitle her to disability retirement benefit. The SC however ruled that hypertension is a listed occupational disease, such being the case it is not necessary that there be proof of causal relation between the work and the illness which resulted in the respondent's disability. The open-ended Table of Occupational Diseases requires no proof of causation. In general, a covered claimant suffering from an occupational disease is automatically paid benefits. As to her glaucoma, the SC ruled that since there appears to be a link between blood pressure and the development of glaucoma, the Court concluded that respondent's glaucoma developed as a result of her hypertension. Such being the case, the latter is likewise compensable under the New GSIS Act.
[2014V1032] GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM vs. AURELIA Y. CALUMPIANO, G.R. No. 196102, November 26, 2014, J. Del Castillo
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GSIS LAW (RA. 8291)
Petitioner filed the instant petition contending that respondent's illnesses, hypertension and Glaucoma, not being work-connected, cannot entitle her to disability retirement benefit. The SC however ruled that hypertension is a listed occupational disease, such being the case it is not necessary that there be proof of causal relation between the work and the illness which resulted in the respondent's disability. The open-ended Table of Occupational Diseases requires no proof of causation. In general, a covered claimant suffering from an occupational disease is automatically paid benefits. As to her glaucoma, the SC ruled that since there appears to be a link between blood pressure and the development of glaucoma, the Court concluded that respondent's glaucoma developed as a result of her hypertension. Such being the case, the latter is likewise compensable under the New GSIS Act.
[2014V1032] GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM vs. AURELIA Y. CALUMPIANO, G.R. No. 196102, November 26, 2014, J. Del Castillo
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Lung Cancer Is Occupational Only With Respect To
GSIS LAW (RA. 8291)
It is true that under Annex "A" of the Amended Rules on Employees' Compensation, lung cancer is occupational only with respect to vinyl chloride workers and plastic workers. However, this will not bar a claim for benefits under the law if the complainant can adduce substantial evidence that the risk of contracting the illness is increased or aggravated by the working conditions to which the employee is exposed to. In the case at bar, aside from Jose's general allegations proving the stressful duties of his late wife, no reasonable proof exists to support the claim that her respiratory disease, which is similar to lung cancer, was aggravated by her working conditions. The records do not support the contention that she had been exposed to voluminous and dusty records, nor do they provide any definite picture of her working environment.
[2014V850] GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM vs. JOSE M. CAPACITE, G.R. No. 199780, September 24, 2014, J. Brion
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It is true that under Annex "A" of the Amended Rules on Employees' Compensation, lung cancer is occupational only with respect to vinyl chloride workers and plastic workers. However, this will not bar a claim for benefits under the law if the complainant can adduce substantial evidence that the risk of contracting the illness is increased or aggravated by the working conditions to which the employee is exposed to. In the case at bar, aside from Jose's general allegations proving the stressful duties of his late wife, no reasonable proof exists to support the claim that her respiratory disease, which is similar to lung cancer, was aggravated by her working conditions. The records do not support the contention that she had been exposed to voluminous and dusty records, nor do they provide any definite picture of her working environment.
[2014V850] GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM vs. JOSE M. CAPACITE, G.R. No. 199780, September 24, 2014, J. Brion
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Tuesday, February 21, 2017
Permanent Total Disability?
EMPLOYEE'S COMPENSATION
The CA correctly ruled that Montierro's condition cannot be deemed a permanent total disability. The Court has already delineated the effectivity of the Crystal Shipping and Vergara rulings in the 2013 case Kestrel Shipping Co. Inc. v. Munar, by explaining: Nonetheless, Vergara was promulgated on October 6, 2008, or more than two (2) years from the time Munar filed his complaint and observance of the principle of prospectivity dictates that Vergara should not operate to strip Munar of his cause of action for total and permanent disability that had already accrued as a result of his continued inability to perform his customary work and the failure of the company-designated physician to issue a final assessment. Applying the 240-day rule to this case, we arrive at the same conclusion reached by the CA. Montierro's treatment by the company doctor began on 4 June 2010. It ended on 3 January 2011, when the company doctor issued a "Grade 10" final disability assessment. Counting the days from 4 June 2010 to 3 January 2011, the assessment by the company doctor was made on the 213th day, well within the 240-day period. The extension of the period to 240 days is justified by the fact that Dr. Alegre issued an interim disability grade of "10" on 3 September 2010, the 91st day of Montierro's treatment, which was within the 120-day period.
NORIEL R. MONTIERO vs. RICKMERS MARINE AGENCY PHILS. INC., G.R. No. 210634, January 14, 2015, C.J. Sereno
The CA correctly ruled that Montierro's condition cannot be deemed a permanent total disability. The Court has already delineated the effectivity of the Crystal Shipping and Vergara rulings in the 2013 case Kestrel Shipping Co. Inc. v. Munar, by explaining: Nonetheless, Vergara was promulgated on October 6, 2008, or more than two (2) years from the time Munar filed his complaint and observance of the principle of prospectivity dictates that Vergara should not operate to strip Munar of his cause of action for total and permanent disability that had already accrued as a result of his continued inability to perform his customary work and the failure of the company-designated physician to issue a final assessment. Applying the 240-day rule to this case, we arrive at the same conclusion reached by the CA. Montierro's treatment by the company doctor began on 4 June 2010. It ended on 3 January 2011, when the company doctor issued a "Grade 10" final disability assessment. Counting the days from 4 June 2010 to 3 January 2011, the assessment by the company doctor was made on the 213th day, well within the 240-day period. The extension of the period to 240 days is justified by the fact that Dr. Alegre issued an interim disability grade of "10" on 3 September 2010, the 91st day of Montierro's treatment, which was within the 120-day period.
NORIEL R. MONTIERO vs. RICKMERS MARINE AGENCY PHILS. INC., G.R. No. 210634, January 14, 2015, C.J. Sereno
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Counter-defense of Insanity
EMPLOYEE'S COMPENSATION
Dennis willfully caused his death while Apolinario's evidence fell short of substantial evidence to establish its counter-defense of insanity. In other words, Apolinario's complaint must be dismissed not because of doubt but because of the insufficiency of his evidence to support his claim of insanity. POEA-SEC requires the employer to prove not only that the death is directly attributable to the seafarer himself but also that the seafarer willfully caused his death, evidence of insanity or mental sickness may be presented to negate the requirement of willfulness as a matter of counter-defense. Since the willfulness may be inferred from the physical act itself of the seafarer (his jump into the open sea), the insanity or mental illness required to be proven must be one that deprived him of the full control of his senses; in other words, there must be sufficient proof to negate voluntariness.
[2014V872] AGILE MARITIME RESOURCES INC., ATTY. IMELDA LIM BARCELONA and PRONAV SHIP MANAGEMENT, INC. vs. APOLINARIO N. SIADOR, G.R. No. 191034, October 01, 2014, J. Brion
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